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Introduction
How should we regulate prices?
Keywords:
Incentive regulation
Uncertainty
Investment: irreversible; economies of scale
Practical importance:
US and elsewhere: TELRIC
NZ: ODV, TSO
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Outline
A simple example
Describe model structure
Cost-minimizing investment
Regulated firm’s cost structure
What level of revenue is reasonable revenue?
Implication for firm’s investment incentives
Conclusion
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A simple example
Investment with scale economies
The one-period interest rate is r
Customers demand 1 unit of capacity this period
Demand equals 1± σ units next period
It costs √s dollars to build s new units of capacity
Cost if 2 instalments
Cost if 1 instalment
Cost
Capacity
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A simple example: Investment
Suppose a firm must meet demand in both periods
It can build 1 + σ units now, costing
√
1 + σ
It can build 1 unit now, and only expand if needed
PV[cost] = 1 + 1
2
√
σ
1 + r
Favour scale
Favour flexibility
PV[Cost]
σ
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A simple example: Investment
Suppose a firm must meet demand in both periods
It can build 1 + σ units now, costing
√
1 + σ
It can build 1 unit now, and only expand if needed
PV[cost] = 1 + 1
2
√
σ
1 + r
The cost to the firm is the smaller of
√
1 + σ and 1 + 1
2
√
σ
1 + r
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A simple example: Incentive regulation
The revenue which the existing firm is allowed to collect
is often based on the cost structure of a hypothetical
replacement firm
Contrast optimized replacement cost (ORC) and
historical cost (HC)
Consider a replacement firm next period
If demand is high, a replacement firm builds 1 + σ
units, costing
ORCh =
√
1 + σ
If demand is low, a replacement firm builds 1− σ
units, costing
ORCl =
√
1− σ
It has an informational advantage
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A simple example: Incentive regulation
If the existing firm locked in the economies of scale last
period,
HCh = HCl =
√
1 + σ
and
HCh = ORCh HCl > ORCl
If the existing firm retained flexibility last period,
HCl = 1, HCh = 1 +
√
σ
and
HCh > ORCh HCl > ORCl
The hypothetical replacement firm faces lower costs.
Why?
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A simple example: Lessons
Lessons so far
Sometimes it is best to invest ahead of demand
Sometimes it is best to retain flexibility (i.e. not invest
too far ahead of demand)
Hypothetical replacement firm has a cost and
informational advantage
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Model set-up
A firm
faces uncertain future demand and capital prices
must satisfy all demand
Investment in capacity
irreversible
economies of scale
physical depreciation
The firm’s allowed revenue is set by a regulator
Key issue: What revenue is ‘reasonable’ under a
scheme of incentive regulation?
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The implications of irreversibility
Cost-minimizing investment policy
Existing firm: wait until it has no excess capacity, and
then increase capacity to g × demand for some g > 1
Replacement firm: invest in capacity of h× demand
for some h > g, then follow the policy above
The consequences:
Capacity
Demand
Time
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The implications of irreversibility
Cost-minimizing investment policy
Existing firm: wait until it has no excess capacity, and
then increase capacity to g × demand for some g > 1
Replacement firm: invest in capacity of h× demand
for some h > g, then follow the policy above
Optimal investment is lumpy, builds excess capacity
A new firm has an informational advantage and can
exploit more economies of scale than the existing firm
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Cost functions
We are interested in three different measures of cost
Cost of continuing in business:
PV [Future invt expenditure]
Cost of replicating the network (with one which is
identical):
RC + PV [Future invt expenditure]
Cost of replacing the network (with one which is
efficiently configured):
ORC + PV [Future invt expenditure∗]
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Cost functions
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What revenue is ‘reasonable’?
‘Reasonable’ rate of return regulation:
PV [Revenue] = historical cost of existing assets
+ PV [Future costs]
Regulated firm is guaranteed cost recovery
‘Reasonable’ incentive regulation?
Form of revenue function:
PV [Revenue] = R(independent of firm’s
past and future decisions)
Firm has incentive to minimize cost
What form should R take?
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Incentive regulation: Possibility #1
Requirement: Firm must be willing to continue in
business
PV [Future revenue]
≥ PV [Future total costs of regulated firm]
Minimum rate of return allowed on ORC is
(Irreversibility multiplier #1)×
(riskfree rate + ORC sys. risk premium−ORC trend)
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Incentive regulation: Possibility #1
Since
PV [Future total costs of regulated firm]
< PV [Future total costs of replacement firm]
if the regulator allows the minimum possible revenue,
then
PV [Future revenue]
= PV [Future total costs of regulated firm]
< PV [Future total costs of replacement firm]
But this means that the firm would not start business in
the first place, or regard future revenue rules as assured
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Incentive regulation: Possibility #2
Requirement: Firm must be willing to start in business
PV [Future revenue]
≥ PV [Future total costs of replacement firm]
Minimum rate of return allowed on ORC is
(Irreversibility multiplier #2)×
(riskfree rate + ORC sys. risk premium−ORC trend)
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Incentive regulation: Possibility #2
The value of the regulated firm is
PV [Future revenue]− PV [Future total costs of regulated firm]
= PV [Future total costs of replacement firm]
− PV [Future total costs of regulated firm]
20 40 60 80 100
10
20
30
40
50
60
70 ORC
Poss #2
Poss #1
Demand
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Incentive regulation: Possibility #2
The value of the regulated firm falls as capacity runs out
Cash inflows increase, while there are no cash
outflows, so why does firm value fall?
Investment becomes more likely as capacity runs out
The firm must be making an expected loss whenever
it has to invest
Explanation: The firm’s revenue is based on the cost
structure of a hypothetical replacement firm, which has
a fundamental cost advantage
Perverse incentives: Firm wants to avoid investment
Implication: Allowed rate of return on ORC needs to be
higher to compensate for the ‘low’ value of ORC
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Incentive regulation: Possibility #3
Requirement: Firm must at least break-even whenever
it has to invest
Minimum rate of return allowed on ORC is
(Irreversibility multiplier #3)×
(riskfree rate + ORC sys. risk premium−ORC trend)
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What is the firm worth?
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Concluding remarks
Results appropriate for rate of return regulation or
reversible investment do not necessarily apply to firms
subject to incentive regulation
Optimized replacement cost is artificially low as a cost
measure, due to
uncertainty
irreversibility
economies of scale
The allowed rate of return applied to ORC must be
increased accordingly
Speculative comment: The allowed rate of return may
be lowered if the firm can delay satisfying demand
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